



After nearly thirty years as an international negotiator, I did
not anticipate that discussing the relationship of international legis-
lation and the negotiating process would be exceptionally difficult.
It seemed to be a neighborhood I knew rather well. Yet, quite often
one works in a neighborhood so long that it becomes like an old
suit of clothes. Then one day, you look around and it is not your
neighborhood anymore; it has changed, and you hardly notice the
change because it was so incremental.
When I began to reflect about where we currently stood with
regard to aspects of international legislation and the negotiating
process, I discovered that a substantial number of changes had
taken place. My thinking on this point was influenced by the fact
that I am counsel in a lawsuit to which the United States is a party.
Belgium, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States are plaintiffs in an action against the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. The central issue of the case can be stated rather
briefly: whether the least depreciated currency is the most appreci-
ated currency. The action concerns a rather large quantity of bonds
- the Young Loan bonds of 1930 which are still in the process of
being paid off as a result of the debt settlement arrangements made
in 1953 when Germany, in effect, went through a voluntary interna-
tional bankruptcy proceeding at the London Conference on Ger-
man external debts. This case has been moving along for quite
some time; the earlier pleadings were fairly conventional. They
concentrated on the standard approaches to the interpretation of
treaty language, history of the contra proferentes, and so forth. In
the final stages, however, we have been dealing with a series of is-
sues in international financial law. The focus of these aspects of the
case has revolved around activities of the International Monetary
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Fund (IMF). The disagreements we are having are concerned to a
great extent with such matters as par values, parities, rates of ex-
change, and the effect of floating on values of currencies. The IMF
is looked to as a primary source of the law on the subject. In effect,
the rulings, decisions, procedures, and practices of the IMF are be-
ing viewed as constituting international law. What is the process by
which these various actions have become international law? It cer-
tainly is not the classical process of making conventional law or
customary law. Yet, the positions of the IMF appear to be accepted
as constituting international law. This leads to a consideration of
the extent to which the classical view of how international law de-
velops remains accurate. Is a tidy division between the effects of
treaty negotiation and the accretion of customary law still plausi-
ble? Does the treaty process remain the major workable means to
develop international law on an integrated basis? The answer to al
three of these questions may be in the negative. It is impossible at
this stage to reach any judgment that is less than speculative.
Nonetheless, it is undesirable that the traditional methods of for-
mulating international law are in the midst of fundamental change.
Consider, for example, the subjects to be addressed at this
Workshop. A very important factor in the current development in
these areas - maritime law, space law, the new international eco-
nomic order, law of the sea and outer space, and developing inter-
national trade law - is that the work is being carried on within an
international organization according to a set of procedures and
practices molded by the Secretariat of that organization. With re-
gard to maritime law, we are currently witnessing a movement
away from a long established method of forming international mar-
itime law through the Comite Maritime International - that is, a
private organization composed of the leading private interests in
the world of shipping. The practice of the Comit has been to for-
mulate draft rules of law on a broad spectrum of shipping issues.
After these rules are formulated, they are sponsored by a govern-
ment - customarily the government of Belgium; a diplomatic con-
ference is held of the old-fashioned type; and the code is adopted.
However, in recent years, more and more of this work has been
taken over by several of the United Nations family of international
organizations. The United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is one such organization. UNCITRAL
recently held a conference in Hamburg to overhaul the 1924 Con-
vention on Carriage of Goods by Sea. The Hamburg Conference
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was based upon a draft produced by a UNCITRAL inter-govern-
mental working group over a five-year period. The legal studies
produced or commissioned by the United Nations Secretariat and
the assistance of that Secretariat played a large role in the produc-
tion by the Hamburg Convention of a complete and rather innova-
tive Convention. The Hamburg Convention will be competing
with a recent product of the Committee on International Maritime
Law called the VISBY amendments, which have made some
changes in the 1924 Convention, but essentially leave intact key
principles which favor heavily the shipowning interests. The UN-
CITRAL draft may win out because it is the product of a universal
organization.
From the standpoint of negotiation, the major difference be-
tween these two methods of treatymaking is the prominent role of
the UNCITRAL Secretariat in the development of the Hamburg
Rules. The Secretariat's contribution is a feature in the current de-
velopment of international law. In nearly all United Nations activ-
ities that deal with the international lawmaking process, the
Secretariat plays an active role. The UNCITRAL Secretariat is an
extraordinarily competent group in my opinion. It has been shaped
by a series of very capable lawyers. Allan Farnsworth will address
the functions of UNCITRAL; I merely wish to stress the body as an
illustration that the negotiating process includes, whenever an in-
ternational organization is concerned, an expert group that is orga-
nized by, or formed from, the Secretariat and that plays an
important role in formulating the convention or treaty or set of
rules under consideration.
The United Nations Commission for Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) also participated in the development of the Hamburg
Convention. UNCTAD is much more of a policy-making organi-
zation than UNCITRAL. Basically, it was set up to provide the
developing countries a forum to explore what could be done to im-
prove their economic status, to improve adverse conditions of trade,
and to eliminate barriers to their development. One thought in set-
ting up the group may have been to permit other international or-
ganizations to move toward saving the world in their own
particular way, without too much debate over equal treatment from
developing states.
UNCTAD turned out to be an activist group rather than a de-
bating society; it plunged into all sorts of projects to transfer money
and technological knowledge and to move power from the wealthy
Vol. 9
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to the developing states. Among other things, it has been quite ac-
tive in maritime law. It has kept a very close eye on UNCITRAL's
activity regarding the carriage of goods by sea. It has attempted to
curtail the authority of the shipping conferences with respect to
rate-fixing. The UNCTAD negotiation procedures have resulted in
some changes in customary international practice.
Negotiating in UNCTAD is designed to take into account the
fact that, for many developing countries in the world of the interna-
tional organization, the vote is their most valuable asset. Their ex-
perience has convinced them that in order to make their votes
effective they must avoid the consequences of the Roman maxim
"divide and conquer." Hence, the developing countries seek to
avoid division; they seek to avoid being taken advantage of, as they
see it, because of shortages in training, expertise, and experience,
the lack of which is often reflected in the dearth of talented people
to carry on negotiations for them. Given the number of interna-
tional organizations which are active in quite technical areas in
which the developing countries have shown an interest, they simply
lack the trained personnel to represent them. How can they prevent
this fact from being used against them? Attendance at a UNCTAD
conference is an eye-opener. There is a plenary session to open the
conference. Then, in effect, this session is adjourned and the devel-
oping countries' representatives meet to decide upon a course of
action - their minimum requirements and what their positions will
be. This may take several days, sometimes even longer. During
this period, the other groups meet to formulate their plans. A
group generally referred to as the "Western European and Others
Group," of which the United States in an "other," meets and dis-
plays the usual lack of cohesiveness in preparing for the conference.
This is indeed one of the most discouraging features of conference
participation if you happen to be a member of the Western Euro-
pean and Others Group. Within this group, there is a propensity to
seek individual national ends; a fairly severe crisis is necessary to
achieve unanimity in the group. After the developing countries
have adopted a unified position, the conferees get down to work.
Usually, the unified position is initially presented to the rest of the
conference on a "take it or leave it" basis. However, there is usu-
ally some degree of "give or take" in the developing countries' uni-
fied position.
While the developing countries could, by sheer force of num-
bers, force acceptance of an agreed position in toto, they realize the
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foolishness of pursuing this course of action absolutely. They real-
ize that the real balance of power does not lie in the number of
states voting; it lies outside their group. Cooperation with the
wealthier states is necessary to achieve real, rather than paper, re-
sults. There are, however, major exceptions to this general ap-
proach, one of which can be discussed in connection with the new
international economic order. Furthermore, the developing states'
monolithic position is not that much of a monolith. The developing
countries' individual interests differ as all states' interest differ.
Under sufficient pressure, their original unified position - which is
itself a compromise - might collapse completely if pushed too
hard. Thus, it is generally possible to achieve a series of com-
promises with respect to the basic unified position and to agree on a
final text of the conference which, of course, never will be satisfac-
tory to everyone - but what conference is?
A part of the developing countries' strategy is to avoid formal
voting to the maximum extent possible. Indicative votes are often
used to demonstrate where the balance of interest lies, but the for-
mal adoption of the provision is mainly on the basis of "without
objection." The atmosphere is inclined to induce broad abstention
in this kind of voting. This type of voting is caused by the belief
that if a clear majority favors a set of articles or a resolution put
forth for acceptance without objection, it would be unfriendly in
the atmosphere of the conference to vote against it. If one does not
agree with the majority view, the inclination is to keep silent.
This practice, which flourishes within UNCTAD, has become
fairly typical of many of the worldwide meetings that take place
under the auspices of the United Nations. The major drawback to
this "passive" approach is that the apparent acceptance, or at least
tolerance, of undesirable positions can result over the course of sev-
eral years in the apparent acceptance of propositions which, if con-
sidered on their merits and in isolation, would be opposed by a
substantial number of states. This development is not just happen-
stance. Rather, it is often the result of a carefully orchestrated ef-
fort by the leaders of a large group of states whose vote is their most
effective asset; it ensures that this asset plays a substantial role in
international life and that it has a payoff. The leaders of this group
are perceptive enough to realize that forcing an issue is not always
the best means to attain their objective, and that the vote is often
most valuable when it does not have to be cast. In many cases, they
seek to avoid showdowns.
Vol. 9
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A recent example of this strategy occurred at the Vienna Con-
ference on the Succession of States to Treaties. At the first session
in 1977, the Council for Namibia, which was established by the
General Assembly to act as an executive arm in relation to
Namibia, was invited to attend. There was some confusion as to
the precise nature of the invitation as well as some discussion at the
outset as to what the position of Namibia in the Conference should
be.
A proposal was advanced by several delegations to seat the
Council for Namibia as a full-fledged delegation, that is, as the rep-
resentative of a state. This proposal provoked considerable reac-
tion from a number of states that were concerned about the effect of
such recognition. While the Council for Namibia easily could have
been accepted as an organ of an international organization, the po-
sition that the delegation represented a state delegation met few, if
any, of the standard conditions which are considered useful in de-
termining whether a state exists. Even though there has never been
a generally accepted definition of what a state is, actual control of
some amount of territory, as well as actual control of some people
in that territory, is needed to be recognized as a state. This initial
effort was settled by giving the Namibian Council a set of arrange-
ments which placed representatives above observer delegations
without making it a state delegation. Nothing more was heard on
the issue until near the end of the conference. At this point, an
effort was made to push through a resolution on a consensus basis.
The resolution demanded that the Namibian Council be treated as
a delegation of the state of Namibia. This created a crisis. Such a
crisis is often created at the close of a session by states desiring to
push a resolution through. It seemed, however, that the resolution
might be pushed to the point of preventing the session from finish-
ing its work. Opposition to the recognition of the Namibian Coun-
cil as a state had solidified the Western European and Others
Group. A reasonable number of other states had indicated they
would oppose the resolution by fighting as hard as they could to
defeat it. As the debate, which disrupted progression on a number
of other issues, droned on, I happened to be chatting with an Afri-
can delegate who was a leader in the push to convert this United
Nations organ into a state. I said to him, "If you are really so inter-
ested and determined to force this issue through, why don't you just
vote it through; you certainly have enough votes?" He replied,
"No, that is not the plan." He did not tell me what that plan was,
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but the issue was settled suddenly on the basis of a few minor con-
cessions as to how the Council representatives should be treated.
In the second and final session of this Conference in 1978, it
was anticipated that the Namibia issue would be pushed from the
outset. Yet, the issue was not raised, and the Conference was com-
pleted with no push to settle the question. At the signing of the
final act, however, after the Convention had been negotiated and
agreed upon, all the state delegations came forth one by one to sign
the text. No sooner had the last delegation signed than the repre-
sentatives of the Council for Namibia came forth and signed the
final act as a state. This obviously had been worked out on a well-
organized and cooperative set of arrangements, because it required
assistance from the Secretariat and other officers of the Conference
to have laid the foundation for this signature without notification or
knowledge of it getting out. No delegation objected to Namibia's
signature. This is an illustration of the effect of setting the prece-
dent of not raising objections to important issues. There should
have been an objection to the Council's signature as a state. Obvi-
ously, the signature in and of itself does not make Namibia a state,
but a final act of a conference is a legal document of considerable
importance in the international sense; what is commenced may de-
velop into a pattern of treating as a state a group that meets none of
the formal requirements of a state. The end result is to weaken the
traditional international law of recognition.
The developing states have made it clear that they consider
traditional international law to be a legal order which was devised
to provide reasons for treating them as colonies when they were
colonies, and for keeping them in what they consider to be a condi-
tion of economic colonization now that they enjoy political free-
dom. In their view, perhaps it is worthwhile to destroy the
traditional definition of a state if it will assist them to achieve what
they consider to be more important ends. The act of signing con-
ference documents is more than a futile gesture.
The experiences -that have occurred with regard to the new in-
ternational economic order clearly exemplify the efforts by the de-
veloping states to establish such an order. To a large extent these
efforts are based on the hypothesis that if one says anything often
enough, it will happen. You may remember that during the 1920's
there was a great fad for something called "Coveism," so named
after its promoter Dr. Cov6. Followers of this good doctor repeated
at stated intervals throughout the day that "everyday in every-way
Vol. 9
7
Kearney: International Legislation: The Negotiation Process
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
NEGOTIATION PROCESS
they were getting better and better." After one had done this often
enough, one was supposed to become better and better. John Gal-
sworthy, in the Forsythe Saga, had Soames Forsythe become a dev-
otee. If such a hard-nosed individual as Soames was lured by this
fad, you can understand what a vogue it was for a while. It might
be that what the developing states are attempting with regard to the
new international economic order is a form of Coveism. They use
international organization procedures, particularly the conference,
to introduce into every convention resolution that has any relation-
ship to their aims and purposes some reference to the new interna-
tional economic order. These references are sometimes innocuous,
sometimes nocuous. There is, however, a general tendency among
the states against whom these resolutions are directed to feel that
these resolutions are not causing any particular harm, and that a
pitched battle against them would be counterproductive in that the
desired conference results might not be achieved. The attitude is,
therefore, to accept the resolution as mere verbiage.
It is useful to inquire whether all this activity is producing in-
ternational law. The answer may be that we just do not know. But
if it is, we will find out too late in the day for our own good. That
developed states have always had sufficient power to protect their
interests is a major element in shaping our strategic planning for
conferences. But is a world environment developing in which this
will no longer be true? It might also be useful to ask whether inter-
national law should be an important element in the framing of na-
tional policy. Roger Fisher referred in his opening statement to the
assertion of Dean Acheson that international law had no bearing
whatsoever upon the Cuban missile crisis. That, of course, is the
standard type of statement Dean Acheson was fond of making -
provocative but untrue. I was the State Department's legal liaison
at the Pentagon during the Cuban missile crisis, and I can say that
international law played a prominent part in that crisis. There was
a group of us in a small office outside the office of the Secretary of
Defense doing such things as calling back the general orders to the
fleet because the Navy had decided to send them out with the word
"blockade" instead of "quarantine." This may seem like something
of little importance, but President Kennedy was enormously con-
cerned about maintaining world support for our control of the high
seas around Cuba, and this was one of the legal positions which we
were relying upon to maintain that support. The intent was to con-
struct a regime that was not too broad - that was not a total block-
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ade of Cuba. This little legal group set up the NAVICERT system
to supplement the quarantine. This again was designed to maintain
the support of other nations by minimizing the interruption of the
normal passage of ships through the area in which we were operat-
ing. A ship which had been issued one of these navigation certifi-
cates could proceed freely through the quarantined area. Why
were we so concerned with getting the world's support? If we had
the world's support, we could count on gaining support within the
United States for what we were trying to do. Vietnam is an illustra-
tion of what happens when public support is lost, and believe me
the dangers involved in the Cuban missile crisis far exceeded any-
thing involved in Vietnam. Cuba was indeed a rather frightening
affair, particularly if one was following the events on the Secretary
of Defense's situation map. The fact that the United States had a
substantial, strong legal position, and that great care was taken to
maintain and improve that position, was an essential element in
solving the Cuban missile crisis. The United States should view the
development of world law as important to our nation's interests and
take into account the necessity of preventing world law from slip-
ping into procedures and forms which may later prove to be intol-
erable to us. The negotiating process is one of the areas in which
care must be taken to ensure that the development of world law is
not undermined for short-range and dubious objectives.
Q. Ambassador Kearney, what specfical4y can the United States do
to avoid the problems you have identified with respect to developing
nations' negotiating tactics and the consequent effect these have on the
development of world law?
A. I wish I had a short, simple answer, but I do not. Certainly we
must start by taking this matter seriously, and perhaps we should
reevaluate our past approaches to negotiation. For example, as I
noted earlier, we are very inclined to seek to wind up conferences
with a win and to have matters tidied up according to schedule.
We like to come out of a conference with an agreed convention -
with an agreed set of principles or an agreed upon working paper.
The problems that are involved in allowing important areas in in-
ternational law to be deformed or weakened, at least from our point
of view, may not seem sufficiently important to delegations - who
are there with specific instructions to get one thing or the other -
to imperil the immediate objective. In the negotiation process, it is
a very difficult task to determine at what stage one should drop the
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immediate gain in order to preserve the medium or long-range fu-
ture of the international order. We must find, however, a means of
balancing competing values. Another negotiating approach we
could change, it seems to me, is just to sit tight when a dilemma
arises. We are inclined to compromise. We think it is sensible to
do so, and indeed it usually is. But there are some issues that
should not be compromised. The problem is to draw accurately a
bead on what is, and what is not, an important principle that should
be protected even at the expense of other, short-term goals. This, it
seems'to me, will have to be addressed on a continuing ad hoc ba-
sis.
Q. Are you suggesting that international awplayed a significant role
in the Cuban missile crisis?
A. There was a lot of support for invading Cuba. International
law played a large part in the decision not to invade Cuba. At that
stage, there were a lot of people who supported an invasion. I did
not intend any in-depth analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but I
thought it useful to point out that international law did play a large
role in emphasizing the need to oppose attempts to change interna-
tional law by default. Certainly international law did not play the
ultimate role, and it would not have had much to do with the deci-
sion whether someone pushed a button and the rockets went off.
That is the position that Acheson was thinking from - that in the
final analysis ultimate force controlled the settlement of the matter.
But that view is overly simplistic. What actually happened was that
a policy of moderation, based in substantial part on international
legal considerations, was successful.
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